

When Does Public Service and Non-Profit Innovation Occur?

With an Emphasis on the Government of Canada

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ABSTRACT

This article explores what is known about antecedents of innovation and which antecedents are most often mentioned in the literature and examines some case studies of governments and non-profit organizations that have emphasized innovation. They exhibited similar factors. The case studies, especially the Government of Canada, revealed the importance of extensive, funded, top-down but assistive initiatives in their cases, particularly focussed on economic projects and the importance of consistent support and implementation over a substantial period of time. Its effectiveness in addressing the need for systemic innovation examined.

Introduction

In 2001 Glor wrote an article, *Key Factors Influencing Innovation in Government*, outlining factors that appeared in proximity to public innovation and emphasizing factors internal to organizations. The paper identified three principal factors: the individual's motivation related to the innovation, the culture within the workplace as influenced by its exterior environment, and the challenge presented by an innovation. The essay argued that these three factors form eight patterns of behaviour in government (Glor, 2001a). From the three factors Glor developed a typology of innovation patterns, ways in which innovations are implemented (Glor, 2001b).

In 2021 Glor investigated what others thought were the key factors in public polity innovation. This systematic literature review (SLR) identified the antecedents of policy innovation as published in the peer-reviewed literature, finding 87 relevant documents and 594 antecedents, 508 of them unique (Glor, 2021a).

This research distinguished trailblazing innovation from innovation adoption. Trailblazing of innovation was defined as Everett Rogers' (1995) first two stages of adoption—innovation (invention, first adoption) and early adoption (identified here as second and third adoptions in a government's community or population). This suggested the possibility either that individual innovations have unique antecedents and the process is chaotic or that there was a lack of systemic analyses of concepts about antecedents. The latter was explored.

In an attempt to clarify and systematize antecedents, the antecedents were analyzed into grouped antecedents (28), factors (15) and clusters (3), each level more comprehensive than the

previous one. The most-mentioned grouped antecedents were citizen pressure, process, structure and political culture. The most-mentioned factors were innovation drivers, people, policy/process, and context. The clusters were external, political and internal factors.¹

The most-mentioned factors in internal cluster were innovation process, drivers, people and internal environment; in external cluster were context and people; in political cluster were drivers, political context and political actors. Multiples more antecedents were identified in the literature for internal cluster than for external and political cluster. External antecedents were only found to be important for policy innovation and dissemination; political antecedents were particularly important for trailblazing. Internal antecedents were important for all types of innovation. Based on the number of mentions, the literature regarded the internal cluster as the most important (the most antecedents were identified for it).

From this SLR, Glor developed a nomenclature and classification system (Glor, 2021 b) for antecedents of public policy (including program) innovation and compared the antecedents of trailblazing and adoption of innovation, and trailblazing/adoption and quantitative/qualitative studies. These were explored six ways. Eleven grouped antecedents of trailblazing (first three adoptions in an innovation population) were importantly different from those of adoption (remaining adoptions), 17 were not. The grouped antecedents of quantitative and qualitative studies were not importantly different from each other, so both were included in the standards developed. Only trailblazing had different antecedents from the other three types of study (innovation adoption, innovations studied with quantitative and qualitative methodologies). Eight grouped antecedents were the best indicators of policy innovation.

Among the three clusters of antecedents, external and internal cluster antecedents were equally important for all four kinds of study (trailblazing, adoption, quantitative, qualitative); political cluster antecedents were different for trailblazing. Although there was no one best political indicator for trailblazing, political cluster mentions were more important for trailblazing than adoption (there was a large difference between trailblazing and adoption), Political cluster had a higher proportion of mentions and internal cluster had a lower proportion of mentions for trailblazing, compared to adoption; concomitantly, political cluster was lower and internal cluster higher for adoption of innovation. The important antecedents for public policy innovation were compared to those for the private sector, public process/policy and public/social innovation: Differences were found. The best antecedent indicators of trailblazing of policy innovation identified in the literature were external environment, drivers, external obstacles and internal people. Political antecedents were also important.

These findings support the argument that trailblazing innovation and adoption of innovation have somewhat different antecedents and that trailblazing occurs when particular antecedents are present.

¹ At around at the same time, Buchheim, Krieger and Arndt (2020) conducted a similar exercise.

What Helps Innovation Occur

Some factors consistently appear when trailblazing occurs. In the internal cluster, the availability of resources (financial and human) turns up consistently in studies of innovation. This seems to occur in other governments as well. For example, the expansion of the arts and the dominance of certain cities in the arts in Europe during the Renaissance occurred during times of prosperity, when both cities and individuals had resources to contract and purchase art. This was true, for example, in Sienna (a civic government) and Florence (a Medici dictatorship) in what is now Italy and in the new Dutch Republic of the United Provinces after the Eighty Years' War for Dutch independence (1568–1648), it became the most prosperous nation in Europe and led European trade, science, and art—the Dutch Golden Age. It was a true republic 1650 to 1672 and 1702–1748.

The Canadian Government of Saskatchewan (GoS) introduced at least 183 trailblazing innovations first, second and third in the USA and Canada. For 77 percent (141) of the innovations (Glor, 2023: column 7), the GoS was first to adopt the innovation in its population. Its population was the other Canadian provinces and territories, the Government of Canada, United States of America (USA) states and USA federal government (see also Glor, 1997, 2002). This occurred as Saskatchewan became a rich province and tax revenue increased. It trailblazed (first, second, third) 182 innovations and adopted one innovation fourth (0.5%) (it is included because it was part of a cluster of trailblazing innovations).

Of course, more than just resources were important. The Saskatchewan government ran for office on an activist political platform. It won a large majority in the Legislature. It had the will to innovate—it wanted to introduce the innovations and was willing to be a leader. The political environment permitted this and accepted some failures. Because Saskatchewan actively recruited staff beyond the province and created a capable public service from a moribund one, it successfully implemented almost all of its proposed innovations. Some other Canadian governments were also innovative at the same time –Alberta (Progressive Conservative government and an economy dominated by oil and gas), the federal (Liberal) government, and, to some extent, Ontario (Progressive Conservative). This was during the 1970s, that featured two substantial increases in the price of oil and gas in the early 1970s and 1978, and inflation, beginning in about 1976. Inflation constrained government revenues and their governments' capacity for innovation. During the early 1980s, the dominant economic and political ideology changed from somewhat social democratic to neoliberal. Conservative governments were elected and government tax cuts, cut-backs and restraint became the dominant interest. Government innovation and expansion was no longer of much interest except to help the private sector.

Today economies and governments are not as prosperous. Governments live either with constraint or cut-backs. For example, the Government of Canada has announced and is expecting to pay for its increased defense spending to meet NATO targets with further cut-backs within the public service. This will include reducing the size of the public service by 30,000 employees over five years; currently (2025), the GoC's public service population is 357,965 ²

² <https://www.canada.ca/en/treasury-board-secretariat/services/innovation/human-resources-statistics/population-federal-public-service.html>

Media and the Official Opposition emphasize expenditures (costs) and numbers of employees as measures of the public service. The neoliberal Opposition disagrees with much of the function of government. Although it does not say so openly, it seems to believe the functions of government, in keeping with far-right perspectives, should only be security (defense and law enforcement), while opposing government intervention in social issues such as healthcare and the environment. The Canadian right takes its perspectives largely from the American right.

Non-profit organizations, too, pitch their benefits as economic. For example, Action Canada, that defends and seeks to advance reproductive rights in Canada, is currently emphasizing that strong economies require strong social systems.

During the 1990s, the public service of the GoC had an initiative in its Treasury Board and a Quality and Innovation Unit, in the form of an informal interdepartmental committee representing numerous departments.³ The unit and committee were abolished during the cut-backs of 1995-96. This was followed by an initiative during the 2000s focused on saving money. Treasury Board loaned departments money to implement initiatives, then booked the savings in departmental budgets.

A new Liberal government elected in 2015 sought to develop a culture and practice of measurement, evaluation, and innovation in program and policy design and delivery. In 2017 it made Michael Moffatt the Chief Innovation Fellow for the Government of Canada, advising Deputy Ministers on innovation policy and emerging trends. The government mandated the Deputy Minister Task Force on Public Sector Innovation to address two priority areas: advancing core systems transformation in areas such as government programming, procurement, partnership development and human resources; and experimenting with disruptive technologies in areas such as artificial intelligence and blockchain technologies. A key part of their renewed mandate saw the establishment of a public sector innovation leadership development program (Deputy Minister Task Force, 2018-2019). The Task Force worked on a portfolio of 11 task force projects and identified and worked across departments with departmental entrepreneurs.”

Within the Privy Council Office (PCO), the Prime Minister’s department, the government created the Impact and Innovation Unit (IIU). It issued five annual reports, 2017-2018 to 2022-2023. It sought to close the implementation gap, enable systems-level change, enable innovation, and develop pathfinder projects (IIU, 2017-18). The key findings of its 5-year comprehensive assessment in 2022-23 were as follows:

- Impact Canada represents a unique and effective approach to solving the increasingly complex policy issues of the 21st century;
- Impact Canada was on track to meet its strategic objectives and was well placed to lead and support policy priorities through the use of advanced policy research, behavioural science, and challenge-based methods as evidenced by its substantial positive impact on numerous critical policy spheres;

³ This was the origin of *The Innovation Journal*. When the TBS initiative was abolished, the author of this paper continued what had started as a newsletter as a scholarly journal.

- Impact Canada's Challenge Program continued to fill a gap in the Canadian innovation ecosystem, experiencing rapid growth from 2 challenge streams valued at \$375 million to 30 active or completed outcomes-based funding projects valued over \$735million, spanning economic, environmental, and social policy domains;
- Built upon world-leading data-driven models of research, Impact Canada's portfolio of behavioural science (BeSci) projects informed the design and implementation of priority programs, services, and initiatives - understanding human behaviour and decision-making in a real-world context to support the implementation of key government priorities;
- Feedback from departments via key informant interviews and surveys overwhelmingly emphasized the importance of Impact Canada's support, with high demand and satisfaction for Impact Canada's Centre of Expertise, Fellowship program, resources, and the Impact Canada portal;
- Impact Canada is a positive story for government, demonstrating strong accountability, value for dollar, and concrete results for Canadians; and
- Impact Canada is an effective approach that should be scaled up more broadly across government (IIU, 2022-23).

While Impact Canada said many of the right things to create a systemic change (embedded, not external; evidence-based; built for scale, mindful of cost), it is project-based and its focus is greater accountability, better data, efficient service and lower cost of delivery (<https://impact.canada.ca/en>). These represent a process focus.

IIU collaborated with the OECD's Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OPSI) to explore and understand how a systemic approach to innovation could be supported in the GoC. A report was prepared by the Observatory of Public Sector Innovation (OPSI) in the Public Sector Reform Division of the Governance Directorate of the OECD. Its report proposed that a systematic approach was required for innovation to become a resource that governments could rely on to help address their priorities (OECD, 2018: 3). The Government of Saskatchewan concluded the same thing in implementing its innovations during the 1970s.

The OPSI suggested that the Public Service of Canada has placed significant emphasis on innovation, that innovation delivers novel solutions that meet the existing and emergent needs of citizens, that a systematic approach is required, and that Canada and other countries should move from sporadic to systemic innovation through a new public sector innovation system model, developed by the OECD (OECD, 2018: 195).

The OPSI report suggested a new framework for understanding and appreciating public sector innovation systems. The model is built from an evidence base gathered by OPSI about what is required for an effective innovation system (a number of articles have been published in *The Innovation Journal* [www.innovation.cc], based on the OECD system). The report looks at case studies in Singapore, the United States, Denmark, Portugal, Australia and 19 aspects of federal Canadian efforts (many are front-end, such as directives, policies and conferences) over the last 30 years to gain insight into what has been achieved and to gain insight into why previous efforts may have been insufficient. It examines the case for a new approach to supporting public sector innovation and reviews what is known about the characteristics of public sector innovation in the Government of Canada. It introduces a new model, building on

the experience of innovation within the Public Service of Canada. The current state of the innovation system of the federal Canadian civil service is appraised to identify areas for attention, proposing that innovation must be considered over a longer time frame rather than from a static snapshot. To consider the future, the report examines the dynamics of the system through the use of three different scenarios.

The OPSI report avoids a prescriptive approach as to what should be done. It identifies potential areas of intervention, but recognises that the context will evolve, and that the specific actions taken should be matched to the ambitions and intent of the actors involved. In my opinion, the GoC has always been good at producing policies and proposals for improvement but not consistently good at implementing them. As always, the key question is whether the ideas will be funded, implemented and assessed.

In 2016, Canada 2020, a progressive think tank, began a project on innovation in the City of London, Canada. Its emphasis was economic (Moffatt and Rasmussen, 2017) and its partners large corporations. It proposed ten big ideas:

- Idea 1 – Create a Parliamentary Coherence Officer
- Idea 2 – Develop Open, Shared, Stewarded and Transparent Data
- Idea 3 – Thicken Labour Markets⁴
- Idea 4 – Re-invent firm and infrastructure financing in Canada
- Idea 5 – Create Financial Regulatory Sandboxes⁵

⁴ When Google was queried “What is a thick labour market?” the AI overview said: “A thick labor market is a large, localized pool of workers and employers, often in specific industries (like tech in Silicon Valley), where there's a high volume of job openings and job seekers, leading to better "matches," lower search costs, higher productivity, and more opportunities for both skilled workers and firms to find the right fit.” The Moffatt and Rasmussen (2017: 118) report highlighted the problems faced by a thin labour market in London, Canada: “In early 2015, the Mowat Centre assembled a roundtable of executives from the emerging information and communications technologies sector in London, Ont., and asked them about their bottlenecks to growth. They identified attraction to and retention of talent in London as their most pressing challenge. Talented technology workers told companies they were reluctant to move to or stay in London for two reasons: 1. There are a limited number of information and communications technologies companies in the London area, so if they ever needed to change jobs, they were concerned they would not be able to find employment quickly in the city. 2. While they could find meaningful employment in the city, they were part of a “power couple” and had concerns about their spouse’s ability to obtain a good job locally. In most cases, the spouse was highly educated and had a very specific skill set valued by only a handful of employers. Both of these problems are ones of thin labour markets with only a handful of buyers and sellers. Thin labour markets are often self-perpetuating. A limited number of firms causes talent to migrate out of a centre, preventing new firms from emerging, causing a further erosion of talent from the market. The “power couple” issue of both individuals having employment opportunities is a particular concern for mid-sized cities.”

⁵ The Moffatt and Rasmussen report (2017:133) said: “A common theme that emerged during the roundtables was that Canada’s “one-size-fits-all” approach to financial regulations works reasonably well for large financial companies, but unnecessarily inhibits the creation of innovative fintech companies. We believe Canada needs to create safe spaces for businesses to test financial innovations without incurring regulatory consequences that are inappropriate for the scale at which those companies are operating. Recommendation: *The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) should spearhead an initiative to create and administer the financial regulatory sandbox where eligible small and emerging companies can operate in a well-defined space and for a limited duration while offering financial products and services to Canadian consumers.*

This financial regulatory sandbox would be similar to the regulatory sandboxes developed by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) in the United Kingdom,⁴⁶ the Australian government and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS). These financial regulatory sandboxes allow businesses to test their ideas and reduce the cost of getting

- Idea 6 - Set “Canada 150 Goals” and “Canada 150 Prizes”
- Idea 7 – Canada-wide Transformation of Numeracy Skills
- Idea 8 – Create a Network of Cluster Research Centres
- Idea 9 – Reform Immigration with a Focus on Tradable Sectors
- Idea 10 – Create Sector-Specific Innovation Accords⁶

Discussion

Since about 2000, the Government of Canada has narrowed its innovation focus to helping the private sector and using innovation largely to reduce government costs. Innovation usually requires new resources, so it is questionable whether innovation will thrive in this context, especially policy and program innovation. Again, the emphasis is on costs rather than investments and benefits. The Liberal party government of Justin Trudeau, prior to the current Liberal government of Mark Carney, had a program it called the Investing in Canada Plan. Launched in 2016, the Government of Canada committed over \$180 billion over 12 years for infrastructure that benefits Canadians – from public transit to trading ports, broadband networks to energy systems, community services to natural spaces. The Plan was designed to achieve three objectives across its five investment streams. To date (2025-09-12), the Plan has invested over \$168 billion in over 100,000 projects, 93% of them completed or underway. These investments are delivered through programs administered by over 20 federal departments and agencies, and involve working closely with provinces, territories, municipalities and Indigenous Peoples. It is notable that one of these priorities is the same or similar to priorities identified under the GoC’s Major Projects List of the current government: Contrecoeur Terminal Container Project, Contrecoeur, Quebec, proposed by the Montreal Port Authority.⁷ Most of the projects are energy-related and would provide support to mines, especially mines of critical minerals.

Impressively, however, the Innovation Impact Unit, in its 2022-23 Annual Report, when reviewing its results in its five-year comprehensive program assessment, had projects in a diverse portfolio of priority policy clusters:

- Clean Technology and Climate
- Housing Supply and Smart Infrastructure
- Food Waste Reduction

innovative ideas to market, yet ensure that consumers are still protected. The sandbox would encourage and support the design and delivery of new financial products and services that benefit consumers and businesses.⁴⁸ The following criteria for choosing participating projects for the sandbox are developed from the frameworks developed by both the FCA⁴⁹ and MAS⁵⁰: 1. Is the new solution novel or significantly different from existing offerings? 2. Does the innovation offer an identifiable benefit to customers? 3. Does the business have a genuine need for testing within the sandbox framework? 4. Has the business invested appropriate resources in developing the new solutions, understanding the applicable regulations and mitigating the risks? 5. Does the business have the intention and ability to deploy the solution in Canada on a broader scale?”

⁶ Accords were tools previously and currently used by the federal government to form agreements with provinces and territories.

⁷ Major Projects Office of Canada: Initial Projects under Consideration, <https://www.canada.ca/en/one-canadian-economy/news/2025/09/major-projects-office-of-canada-initial-projects-under-consideration.html> 2025-09-12.

- Space-based Technologies
- Health and Public Health

The policy clusters involved working across ten federal departments, with over 2,500 applicants to Impact Canada, and collaborating with over 300 external experts acting as jury members to assess solutions and recommend winners for funding.

The IIU had attempted to address some major and long-standing problems. These included, for example, addressing societal challenges by developing:

- (1) A game-changing device that accurately and quickly tested illegal street drugs for multiple substances, including hard-to-detect fentanyl;
- (2) A mining technology designed to selectively break particles and sort waste from desired minerals, reducing crushing and grinding requirements (and therefore pollution) and reaching over 35 per cent energy savings across several commodities;
- (3) A battery technology for storing energy in zinc metal;
- (4) A bio jet fuel that converts municipal solid waste, forestry and agricultural biomass, into sustainable chemicals and advanced biofuels, including sustainable aviation fuel;
- (5) Indigenous housing innovation resulting in the building of an eight-unit residential facility that provides safe, transitional, emergency housing with professional and culturally sensitive support for community members escaping violence. The facility also includes six hotel units accessible from a separate entrance for those visiting the community to generate revenue to support the facility's operation and maintenance. (IIU, 2022-23: 7-8).

Current challenges being addressed include:

- (1) Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada: Producer mental wellbeing and Agricultural methane reduction (2 projects);
- (2) Aqua-lunar challenge;
- (3) Type 2 diabetes prevention;
- (4) Indigenous off-diesel initiative;
- (5) Canada Mortgage and Housing: Housing supply
(<https://impact.canada.ca/en/outcomes-based-financing#projects>).

Future projects were identified as:

- (1) Net reduction of enteric methane emissions from cattle;
- (2) A new round of Infrastructure Canada's Smart Cities Challenge will be focusing on connected technologies, data, and innovative approaches to improve climate resiliency and help communities reduce the risks and impacts posed by weather-related events and disasters. Previous communities supported under this initiative included Montreal, Quebec; Guelph, Ontario; communities of Nunavut; and Bridgewater, Nova Scotia.
- (3) Continuation of Work with the Canadian Space Agency to develop a potential new challenge relating to In-situ resource utilization on the lunar surface, more particularly in water purification to remove contaminants from water extracted from lunar regolith that may also have benefits to support water purification here on Earth.

Because the innovation initiative is located in the Privy Council Office instead of, as formerly, the Treasury Board Secretariat, it has been able to address policy and program issues. Earlier efforts by the TBS to improve and make more efficient the administration of the federal government were not as high profile. The IIU said of its efforts: “The IIU’s role sits in an otherwise unoccupied space – supporting both PCO’s mandate, as well as generating evidence and providing advice to key federal organizations, other orders of government, non-governmental stakeholders, and international organizations” (IIU, 2022-23: 19). This is indeed an effort to have a broader impact.

Other governments have also attempted to increase efficiency and service. The well-known ones are Singapore, the United States, Portugal (Lapão, 2008), Australia, Saudi Arabia (Bendary and Rajadurai, 2024), Kazakhstan (Bokayev, Amirova, Abilzhan, Yessengeldina and Sadykova, 2024.), and Denmark (Sørensen and Vabo, 2020).

Systemic Change

It is difficult for systems to change themselves in fundamental ways. Typically, they make changes to enhance their control and assure their survival. Control is normally supported by data and requires action based on the evidence created to enhance survival. Many governments and non-profits have created data-collection processes but have not been as good at identifying risks that require action and have often failed to act on risks even when they have been identified.

Canadian governments are as guilty of this as have been many others. They have reasons for failing to act: complexity of issues, jurisdictional overlap, lack of clarity about what should be done, costs, lack of will, risk blindness, mixed objectives (e.g. need to increase spending, need to cut costs) being some of them. This failure to act has had serious consequences and are likely to have more in the future. Pacciani and Mussio (2026), risk assessment professionals, call this a strategic memory crisis, a pathology of risk blindness, strategic blindness/amnesia and an inability to comprehend risk.

Some examples of cases Pacciani and Mussio describe where risks were known but not acted upon include collapsed dams and bridges, grounded fleets, burned towns and frozen banking systems: collapse of Vajont Dam on Monte Toc in Italy, killing 2000 people; collapse of Genoa’s Morandi Bridge, killing 43; incineration of one-third of the town of Jasper, Canada and Grenfell Tower in London; a single 2024 software update that grounded thousands of airplane flights, froze banking systems and cancelled surgeries worldwide. Meticulous documentation was followed by catastrophic failure. This institutional failure was caused by personnel turnover and loss of memory (sometimes caused by downsizing); the conflict between “story” and “body, between bureaucratic narratives (safety reports, economic models, political optics) and physical reality.

Pacciani and Mussio diagnose three interlocking failures that produce catastrophe: fragmentation of knowledge across silos until no single organization possesses the complete picture, absence of accountability for synthesis, warnings are recorded but action is not

compelled, economic incentives that proceeding on the present pathway is more profitable than pausing.

This destruction is a choice, not an inevitability. Some institutions have installed memory into their operating systems. Lloyd's of London is one—it has survived 337 years of catastrophes. Lloyd's is in the business of underwriting insurance--predominantly general insurance and reinsurance, with a small amount of term life insurance. Insurance companies have been warning of the risk presented by and consequences of climate change for decades.

These are one kind of systemic problem that needs addressing. There are others. They are the kinds of problems that lead the public to lose confidence in government and non-profits. Populist leaders speak to kinds of failures, though their solutions are unlikely to solve the problems.

Conclusion

The case study of the Canadian federal government innovation infrastructure during the Justin Trudeau government of 2015 to 2025 revealed an extensive, funded, top-down but assistive initiative, focussed especially on economic projects. This is buy-in innovation, as described by Glor (2001a, b). While success is claimed, what it was, how and why, and at what cost was not made clear. The 2022-23 Annual Report said “the review concluded that there were no serious gaps in documented processes with respect to effectiveness and efficiency” (IIU: 20). Satisfaction with the initiative was primarily assessed through surveys. The goal of the Impact Canada Initiative was identified as to “develop new policy and program methods to better address government priorities and make meaningful impacts in the lives of Canadians” (IIU: 3). In the Canadian government, however, interest in innovation has been periodic, not systemic. Both the Deputy Minister Task Force and the OECD highlighted this problem.

Instead of introducing a systemic approach, a new government in 2025 has not shown as much public interest in innovation and addressing systemic problems. It is preoccupied with addressing the risk presented by the USA's withdrawal from free trade and tariffs. The solution is seen as reducing regulation and proceeding with major economic projects, focused on traditional industries (energy). No requirement for innovation has been underlined, except the unproven innovation of carbon sequestration, as requested by the oil and gas industry. The federal government is promoting the traditional Canadian economy of agriculture and mining with no specific interest in economic or public service innovation. Rather, it is focussed on restraint within the public service, expecting to come close to paying for its increases in defence spending through restraint on the public service operating budget. This problem of inconsistent support for innovation, its implementation and an on-again, off-again interest is a serious one, a systemic one. It occurred when the innovative Blakeney government lost power in Saskatchewan in 1982 and it may be happening again as the federal government transitions from Liberal prime ministers Trudeau to Carney. The Carney government has notably implemented a number of policies from the Conservative playbook and is implementing a major public service downsizing. Cut-backs often target new programs and new initiatives. Canadian governments are good at

developing ideas and policies but they have trouble with consistent implementation, a systemic problem.

In Canada, innovation has occurred in government when it has political and public service support, new resources and an implementation program that lasts long enough to see results. Political support, resources, implementation and active promotion were found in the innovation initiatives that are considered successful in other countries as well.

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